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Abstract: 
This paper explores that application of evolutionary approaches to the study of 
entrepreneurship. An eclectic approach that aims to highlight the multiple sources of 
evolutionary thought that frequently remain outside the boundaries of organizational 
theorizing is used. It is argued that any evolutionary theory of entrepreneurship must 
appreciate the foundations of evolutionary thought as much as it must consider the nature 
entrepreneurship. The central point being that we must move beyond a debate or preference of 
the natural selection and adaptationist viewpoints. Then, the interrelationships between 
individuals, firms, populations and the environments within which they interact may be better 
appreciated.     
 
1. Introduction 
During recent times, the frequency of calls for researchers of entrepreneurship to adopt 
an evolutionary approach has increased. Two of the domain’s leading journals (i.e. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice and the Journal of Business Venturing) have organised 
special editions devoted to consideration of the increasing application of evolutionary theories 
to the study of entrepreneurship. Appropriately, the work of Howard Aldrich strongly 
influences the content and contributors of these special editions. Aldrich’s (1999) articulation 
of a generic evolutionary framework to advance our understanding of social change is perhaps 
destined to become a landmark contribution within the developing field of entrepreneurship 
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research. Yet, despite the breadth of its contribution, many questions remain unresolved, 
many raised by Aldrich himself in his concluding ‘invitation’ chapter. This paper accepts the 
challenge of Aldrich’s challenge to further explore the application of evolutionary theory to 
the emergence and disappearance of organizational entities. In doing so, this paper 
deliberately adopts a very eclectic approach, attempting to synthesize ideas that seemingly 
remain isolated. The journey of confronting the problems that prevent the development of a 
legitimate evolutionary approach to the study of entrepreneurship is one requiring much 
compromise.  
 
This paper is structured in the following manner. First, the importance of an 
evolutionary approach to entrepreneurship research is considered. Second, the prerequisites of 
an evolutionary approach are discussed. Third, problematic issues that remain contested are 
explored through consideration of areas of emerging consensus. Fourth, the nature of 
empirical evidence required to progress the development of an evolutionary approach to 
entrepreneurship research is discussed. In keeping with the Aldrichian spirit, the paper 
concludes by drawing out the implications that arise from this discussion and presents more 
questions that remain unanswered.   
 
2. Past Calls and Present Application of Evolution to Entrepreneurship 
Entrepreneurship research represents a domain of enquiry that is at present ‘anchored 
in the disciplines’ of economics, sociology, organizational theory, and psychology 
(Davidsson, Low & Wright, 2001, p. 14). To many, entrepreneurship has yet to emerge as a 
respected discipline in its own right. This is disappointing given the importance of 
entrepreneurship research to addressing the issues economic and social change. In 1988, 
Murray Low and Ian MacMillan raised six specific concerns relating to past and future 
research into entrepreneurship. The six specific areas of critical importance to 
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entrepreneurship researchers reviewed were: purpose, theoretical perspective, focus, level of 
analysis, time frame, and methodology. These specific issues have generally received isolated 
attention, with the obvious exception being the increased use of evolutionary theories. This 
approach has enabled an increased focus on not only context and process, but also causal 
explanations relating to the outcomes of entrepreneurial behaviour.  
 
In contrast to calls for a ‘predictive theory of the behavior of entrepreneurs’ (Amit, 
Glosten & Muller, 1990, p 1232), ‘non-predictive’ evolutionary perspectives enable the 
specific issues raised by Low and MacMillan (1988) to be fully accommodated, thereby 
advancing the cause of entrepreneurship as a distinct research discipline. Examples include; 
Aldrich and Martinez’s (2001) direct response to Low and MacMillan; Aldrich’s (1999) use 
of an evolutionary perspective to consider organizational change; Brittain’s (1994) ecological 
explanation of community evolution; Baum and Singh’s (1994) consideration of the 
replicating and interacting hierarchical processes; Murmann and Tushman’s (2001) assertion 
that social context is an important determinate of entrepreneurial activity; and Lumsden and 
Singh’s (1990) discussion of organizational speciation. These examples demonstrate the 
widespread use of evolutionary theories to research various aspects of entrepreneurship.   
 
Throughout these exemplars attention is paid to purpose (a general focus on how 
entrepreneurship furthers economic progress); theoretical perspective (a trend from strong to 
weak selection, ensuring adaptive and environmental change factors are simultaneously 
considered); focus (greater emphasis placed upon understanding the context and process of 
entrepreneurship); level of analysis (consideration of hierarchical interacting relationships at 
which selection occurs, for example, the ecosystem, communities of practice, populations of 
firms, firms, routines, individuals); time frame (greater appreciation of cohort and period 
effects); and methodology (acceptance of multiple methods and a greater importance given to 
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causality). An evolutionary approach accommodates and places great emphasis on all six 
issues, however, the nature and design of evolutionary approaches remains quite varied.  
 
Differences of opinion remain within the literature as to what constitutes an 
evolutionary approach or theory. The original ideas of Lamarck and Darwin clearly have lost 
their shape through repeated reinterpretation and transfer from one domain to another. Rather 
than attempt a top-down unravelling of what exists, a more profitable approach may be to 
proceed from the bottom-up, determining the prerequisites of an appropriate evolutionary 
approach to the study of entrepreneurship.   
 
3. Prerequisites of an Evolutionary Approach 
To address this issue, two perspectives are considered, one economic and the other, 
philosophical. Economic theory represents the most enduring of theoretical bases upon which 
entrepreneurship research has been guided. While acknowledging the difficulties of 
classifying all manner of items, a taxonomy of economic evolution is provided by Hodgson 
(1993). Two broad perspectives of evolution are considered, those being developmental and 
genetic evolution. The developmental perspective adopts the view that evolution would 
progress through a series of stages, as if the outcome was predicable. An example being the 
Marxian idea that a socio-economic system evolves from a primitive form of communism, to 
classical antiquity, to feudalism and capitalism, to socialism and communism. Hodgson uses 
the term genetic in a non-biological way to mean an emphasis upon determining causality 
with regards the interacting components of a system. Within the genetic perspective, 
ontogenetic and phylogenetic categories exist.  
 
Ontogenetic evolution (e.g. Schumpeter) has a weak focus on selection mechanisms 
and is characterised by a belief that a fixed genetic instruction set (moderated by 
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environmental conditions) is representative of a (single) entities set of evolutionary 
possibilities. In contrast, phylogenetic evolution places great emphasis on selection to 
establish causality. The works of Thorstein Veblen provide the earliest example of 
phylogenetic evolution being proposed in the economic sphere. Hodgson (1993) notes the 
argument against the ontogenetic position of consummation in economic evolution by Veblen 
(1919) in favour an evolutionary explanation related to selection within populations and 
focused on causality.  
 
So, from an economic perspective, evolution can take the form of a developmental 
theory that presumes the advancement from one state to another. It also can be considered 
from a genetic perspective, with two different approaches. Firstly, it can be considered 
ontogenetic, where the outcomes of change for a particular entity are seemingly 
predetermined with only environmental influence altering the eventual equilibrium position. 
Alternatively, the process of phylogenetic evolution allows for the ‘complete and ongoing 
evolution of a population’ (Hodgson, 1993, p. 40) with acceptance that the generative 
mechanisms that determine structural change may also be altered through a blind (and 
differential) process of selection. This second evolutionary perspective is one developed by 
philosophers of science. At the heart of their work is the central issue of what constitutes an 
evolutionary theory. 
 
3.1 Minimal Evolutionary Requirements 
The recent philosophical musings of several prominent academics has advanced the 
basic minimal requirements of evolutionary theory and also raises the issue of Lamarckism as 
a potential strange bedfellow for Darwinism within the socioeconomic sphere. This section 
will consider the minimal requirements for a sound evolutionary theory. With reference to 
Darwin’s principle of natural selection, Lewontin articulated three evolutionary principles. 
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The first principle being phenotypic variation where different entities in a population have 
‘different morphologies, physiologies, and behaviours’ (Lewontin, 1970, p. 1). The second 
principle being differential fitness, or, the differential survival and reproduction of phenotypes 
in different environments. The third principle being heritable fitness, or, the ‘correlation 
between parents and offspring in the contribution of each future generations’. Lewontin 
proposed that any population displaying these principles would undergo transformation.  
 
Closely related was Campbell’s (1965) blind-variation-selective-retention process, 
which aimed to explain the general evolutionary process occurring within and between 
entities. This was to become the foundation of Campbell’s ‘evolutionary epistemology’, a 
phrase he coined in 1974 (Plotkin, 1993). Importantly, Campbell successfully championed the 
long held view1 that a general theory of evolution was indeed applicable beyond the 
boundaries of biology (Hodgson, 2003a). Eventually, the perceived ubiquity of blind-
variation-selective-retention process led Dawkins (1983) to coin the phrase ‘Universal 
Darwinism’. Hodgson (2003b, p. 90) states that ‘the difference between natural and social 
evolution was in the units of selection and in the details of the evolution process, not in the 
exclusion of variation, inheritance [i.e. retention], or selection from the social sphere’. An 
alternative, but complementary view (Plotkin, 1993) to that of the blind-variation-selective-
retention process also exists. That is David Hull’s proposition that an evolutionary theory 
must incorporate two specific entities, a replicator and a interactor. These terms are defined 
by Hull (1988, p.408) as any ‘entity that passes on its structure largely intact in successive 
replications’ and any ‘entity that interacts as a cohesive whole with its environment in such a 
way that this interaction causes replication to be differential’, and are widely accepted. 
 
                                                 
1 Hodgson (2003a) notes the application to of Darwinian ideas outside the realm of biology had long been 
promoted by many prominent individuals, including Bagehot (1872), James (1880), Ritchie (1896), Peirce 
(1898), Veblen (1899, 1919), and Baldwin (1909).  
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However, while Darwinism provides a rigorous theory and has at its heart a focus upon the 
problem of causality, the challenge remains to identify a process of transmission from within 
which ‘selected variants are moved about in space and conserved in over time’ (Plotkin, 1993, 
p 84). Indeed, Durham suggests that this challenge is but one of five essential requirements of 
any evolutionary system, illustrated in Figure 1 below.  
 
Figure 1. The System Requirements for Evolution 
 
1. Units of Transmission 
2. Sources of Variation 
3. Mechanisms of Transmission 
4. Processes of Transmission 
5. Sources of Isolation 
 
    Source: Durham (1991, p. 22) 
 
Determining the units of transmission within the socio-economic domain has long 
represented a complex debate. There would now appear to be convincing arguments2 within 
the current literature that habits and routines are suitable representative units of transmission. 
Sources of variation are typically accounted for by means of innovation, imitation, and new 
entrants. To establish a process of cumulative causation, it is vital that a mechanism of 
transmission is identified and explained. This however remains a challenging task for 
evolutionary theorists. Knudsen (2002, p. 451) implores researchers ‘to account for the 
mechanism of transmission and the infusion of new but not limited variation around the mean 
of what turned out to provide an advantage’. Similarly, Murmann (2003, p. 11) suggests the 
challenge that remains for any evolutionary explanation ‘is to specify how variants are 
introduced, how selection leaves behind variants that were not as fit according to the 
prevailing selection criteria (criteria that in turn need to be identified), and how some variants 
                                                 
2 See Hodgson (2003a; 2001) regarding the respective merits of memes, ideas, habits, and routines as replicating 
entities. 
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are retained over time to create a historical trajectory or genealogy captured by decent with 
modification’.   
 
What becomes evident is that in order to meet the minimal requirements of an 
evolutionary theory in the socio-economic domain, only certain forms of phylogenetic 
economic evolution satisfy the requirements of Lewontin, Campbell, Hull, and Durham. 
Across these perspectives is the need for variation to be blind (in the sense that we cannot 
predict the future), random, or purposive in character, selection must be differential, and a 
mechanism must exist through which favoured characteristics are retained in a population and 
passed on to other generations. The alternative developmental perspective is tolerant of and 
expecting the presence of an eventual equilibrium. Likewise, Hodgson (1993) also notes that 
Schumpeter uses the term evolutionary in the ‘developmental’ sense while also rejecting any 
analogy with natural selection. Lastly, Hodgson also notes the tendency of Hayek’s (1988) 
‘spontaneous order’ to gravitate towards to an equilibrium. Also, Hayek’s support of 
methodological individualism is problematic, suggesting an eventual focus upon one sole 
level of selection. Essentially, Hayek’s evolutionary theories are consummatory with 
creativity and ongoing variety restoring order, rather than continually providing the seeds 
discontent. The varied and related minimal requirements of an evolutionary approach can be 
illustrated in Figure 2 below. Importantly, the degree of consistency that is present in the 
seminal works of Campbell, Lewontin, Durham, and Hull are all derived from a Darwinian 
perspective.  
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Figure 2. Prerequisites of an Evolutionary Theory 
  Innovation, Natural Inheritance Habits  Questions 
  Imitation, & Selection & Replication & Remaining 
  New Entrants Adaptation & Boundaries Routines Unanswered 
Campbell Variation Selection Retention     
Lewontin Phenotypic  Differential Heritable     
  Variation Selection Fitness     
Durham Sources of  Process of  Sources of Units of Mechanism of 
  Variation Transmission Isolation Transmission Transmission 
Hull       Replicators Interactors 
 
Since the verbose writings of Veblen, the presence of Darwinian selection is accepted 
amongst ‘old’ institutional economists (e.g. Hamilton, 1953 and Hodgson, 2003b) and 
increasingly in other areas other social sciences. In contrast to orthodox economics, this 
school of thought is comfortable to develop an evolutionary perspective without the need of 
equilibrium assumptions. The recent works of Geoffrey Hodgson in renewing Veblen’s post-
Darwinian thoughts are important with regards advancing an evolutionary theory through 
which entrepreneurial behaviour is explainable.  To address this point, it is first necessary to 
briefly consider the nature and relationships between Darwinian and Lamarckian ideas and 
how they relate to the neo-Darwinian position. This is perhaps best achieved by noting briefly 
how these theories have been applied in organizational, economic and entrepreneurship 
literature. Hodgson (2003a, p. 95) defines Darwinism as ‘a causal theory of evolution in 
complex or organic systems, involving the inheritance of genotypic instructions by individual 
units, a variation of genotypes, and a process of selection of the consequent phenotypes 
according to their fitness in their environment’. Hodgson continues on to define Lamarckism 
as ‘a doctrine admitting the possibility of the (genotypic) inheritance of acquired (phenotypic) 
characters by individual organisms in evolutionary processes’. 
 
3.2 Problematic Issues and Areas of Emerging Consensus 
The processes of Darwinian selection and Lamarckian adaptation tend to anchor 
opposing sides of a debate that has prevailed for decades within the economic and 
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organizational theory literatures (Lewin & Volberda, 1999). This debate centres upon the 
respective influence of the environment to select under performing firms from an industry, 
versus the ability of firms to arrest the process of natural selection through adaptation to the 
their changing environment. Lamarck (1984, p. 70) felt that the ‘progress in complexity of an 
organisation exhibits anomalies here and there … due to the influence of environment and of 
acquired habits’. Generally, socioeconomic evolution has been considered Lamarckian in 
nature (e.g. Nelson & Winter 1982) due to the fact that it is purposive (Rescher, 1977). That 
said, sound arguments that socioeconomic evolution is first and foremost Darwinian exist 
(Dollimore, 2003), and these will be considered in more detail throughout this paper. 
 
It is however perhaps due to the outright rejection of Lamarckian evolution by 
biologists in favour of Charles Darwin’s theory of natural selection (i.e. modification by 
decent), the two views have assumed a degree of rivalry. This is disappointing given the 
desire of Campbell (1965) to advance a general evolutionary theory of the processes occurring 
within and between entities. As a result, those who support the population ecology views (e.g. 
Hannan & Freeman, 1977) often to fail to consider the likelihood of firm level adaptation. 
Alternatively, advocates of contingency theory (e.g. Donaldson, 1988) and strategic choice 
perspectives (Miles & Snow, 1994) continue to assert that variation arises from environmental 
change and that firm’s are capable of securing a fit with their operating environment. The 
middle ground of this debate belongs to those pragmatic researchers who seek to understand 
the interrelated process of selection and adaptation (e.g. Levinthal, 1991; Haveman, 1992; 
Amburgey, Kelly, & Barnett, 1993; Bruderer & Singh, 1996; Rao, 1998). Such approaches 
tend to acknowledge both Darwinian and Lamarckian processes. Charles Darwin was at least 
tolerant of Lamarckian evolution (Hodgson, 2001) on the proviso that ‘acquired characters are 
inherited only rarely and weakly’ (Gould, 2002, p. 354). On this basis, Darwin noted, ‘that 
natural selection has been the most important, but not the exclusive, means of modification’ 
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(1901, p. 4). Others suggest that Darwin eventually became very reliant upon Lamarck’s 
acquired characteristics3 to overcome a potentially fatal challenge to his mechanism of 
heredity (Koestler, 1978). Therefore, an evolutionary theory must also address the occurrence 
of variations associated with adaptive behaviours within evolving systems.  
 
Importantly, Veblen’s Darwinism also incorporated aspects of Lamarckism, 
specifically, the inheritance of acquired characters (Hodgson, 1993). However, following 
Veblen’s death in 1929, the unpopularity of social Darwinism4 and the increasing acceptance 
of the term neo-Darwinism in society, the further development of Veblen’s post-Darwin 
economics where thwarted. The term neo-Darwinian has existed since Darwin’s protégé 
George Romanes used it to describe those who explicitly rejected the possibility of the 
inheritance of acquired characteristics as being ‘more Darwinian than Darwin’ (Wilkins, 
2001, pp. 161-162). Within the domain of socio-economic evolution, Weismannism is the 
term used to describe the neo-Darwinist position. Essentially, the mechanisms through which 
organizational structures are created remain unaltered through interaction with the operating 
environment. This view is more in line with the process of natural selection operating upon 
firms within a given population. Therefore, when adopting a Darwinist perspective, the 
previously dominant position that Weismannism and Lamarckism are mutually exclusive is 
less valid. This is because there is little difference between the causal structures of both forms 
of evolution (Knudsen, 2002, p. 451) with ‘the only thing that sets Lamarckian selection apart 
from neo-Darwinian selection is that replicators are modified due to information received 
from their carriers, the interactors’.  
 
                                                 
3 English engineer, Fleeming Jenkin demonstrated that Darwin’s blending theory would not allow favourably 
selected biological traits to be inherited. Darwin’s 6th edition of The Origins of Species resurrected Lamarck’s 
theory of acquired characteristics (Koestler, 1978, p 180), only for it to be again ignored by his followers. 
4 The advent of the Second World War saw negative attitudes associated to Spencer’s social Darwinism 
incorrectly transferred to many Darwinian ideas and concepts.  
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The recent work of Knudsen (2001) and Hodgson (2001) suggests that we can work 
towards a more intuitive, and more Darwinian explanation of the processes of firm/population 
transformation that embodies both Weismannian and Lamarckian processes. From this 
perspective, Lamarckian evolution nests within a Darwinian framework that also 
accommodates the process of natural selection. Such an approach is consistent with Williams 
(1996, p. v) who states that ‘when recognised, adaptation should be attributed to no higher a 
level of organization than is demanded by the evidence. Natural selection is the only 
acceptable explanation for the genesis and maintenance of adaptation’. The focus is not purely 
upon environmental elements (i.e. political, economic, socio-cultural, technological, and 
international forces) to determine fitness, but rather the interplay between the environment 
and the firm’s activities that play the role of interactors. However, clearly issues remain 
unresolved that prevent the advancement of an evolutionary theory through which 
entrepreneurial processes and outcomes can be better understood. ‘The next step in 
entrepreneurial research is very clear: we need to stop a posteriori explaining the interaction 
between strategy and environment and between process, context, and outcomes’ (Aldrich & 
Martinez, 2001, p 53). 
 
 4. The Need for Empirical Evidence 
The task at hand would appear the need to generate theory that can be later verified 
and tested for accuracy. So many questions remain unanswered and without consensus. This 
section will consider four important issues that currently provide roadblocks to the 
development of a sound evolutionary theory. The first is the contentious issue of whether 
Lamarckian evolution should be assumed to better explain socioeconomic evolution than 
Darwinism. The second issue relates to the nature of selection at its multiple forms within and 
outside social entities. The third issue is concerned with what elements of an entity interact to 
with the environment in such a way that favourable (or non-favourable) selection occurs. The 
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last issue to be discussed is that of the nature of replication. It is argued that at present, our 
general understanding of how all four processes exist (and are interrelated) as applied to 
entrepreneurship research is insufficient to support the development of a sound evolutionary 
theory of entrepreneurship. The remainder of this section attempts to highlight areas of 
confusion that are increasingly less serviced by conceptual theorizing. It is from empirical   
research that the way forward must be achieved. Lets consider the four issues raised thus far 
and then the possible relationships between them. 
 
4.1 Lamarckism  
At the heart of Lamarckism are two specific laws that Jean-Baptiste Lamarck outlined 
in his most famous work, the Philosophie Zoologique published in 1809. The first law, called 
the ‘law of use and disuse’ suggests that new organs, or modified old ones, occur 
spontaneously through need satisfied by use and disappear through disuse. The second law, 
called the ‘law of inheritance of acquired characteristics’ maintains that any such change is 
heritable. Consequently, Lamarckism provides the means through which continuous and 
gradual change can occur within organisms through which a better degree of fitness is 
achieved vis-à-vis their environments. The underlying assumption is that the Lamarckism is a 
function of the organism’s physiological needs that is continually altered through interaction 
with the environment.  
 
In the past it has not been uncommon for work to be presented as Lamarckian in 
nature (e.g. Nelson & Winter, 1982). As a result, it would seem that the term Lamarckism is 
all to easily applied within work where social learning and intentionality are taken as given. 
That is, where it is accepted that humans and the organizational forms they create and operate 
are capable of searching for and selecting in favor of new forms of variation that are 
perceived at some point in time to advance their situation. As a result, social change achieved 
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through the generic evolutionary processes of variation, selection and retention is increasingly 
described as Lamarckism5. However, the emphasis is clearly more related to Lamarck’s first 
law than the second law. To demonstrate empirically the role and frequency of Lamarckism 
with the domain of socioeconomic evolution, the inheritance of acquired characters from one 
generation to another must be shown to occur.   
 
The challenge that remains, regardless of whether one accepts that the process of 
Lamarckism nests within an overarching Darwinian framework (Knudsen, 2002), is to 
separate the occasions when acquired characters6 are retained within the life of a social entity 
and when they are passed on to another generation of that entity. It is argued that the failure to 
do so will add a burden to those researchers who wish to develop a truly sound evolutionary 
account for socioeconomic change. Both laws must be accounted for, not merely the presence 
of acquired characters. Lets explore further the issue by way of example to illustrate the 
present dilemma that accompanies current assumptions that socioeconomic evolution is 
inherently Lamarckian. 
 
Consider the Hobart pizza industry that has emerged over the past 35 years. Of the 100 
plus firms that have contested this industry, some foundings have survived to this day. Many 
have failed, and many have entered the industry with prior experience and/or knowledge 
gained from past employment. Early on during the formation of the industry, relational ties 
between the predominately Italian pioneers were strong. Knowledge related to improvements 
and the nature of how best to operate a pizzeria was shared frequently at weekly social 
occasions. As the industry developed, relational ties weakened as the population density 
increased and competition increased. For those new entrants that were not part of the initial 
                                                 
5 Hodgson (2001) and Knudsen (2001) maintain that the underlying casual structure of Lamarckian evolution is 
actually Darwinian in nature. 
6 The term ‘acquired characters’ is used in conjunction with Hull’s (2001) insistence that within such a context 
they are only potentially inheritable in a metaphoric sense.  
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network of pioneers, learning how best operate their pizzeria was achieved through either 
employment within the industry or through (partial) imitation of businesses practices that by 
and large were quite transparent. Over time, the survival of many, but not all entrants can be 
explained by Lamarckian evolution.  
 
It can be clearly observed that many past employees of the pioneers who worked in 
operations that continually acquired characters that (apparently) increased fitness in the 
emerging industry were able to spin-off successful pizzerias themselves. Further, many of the 
spin-off’s employees were able to start up pizzerias within which the practices of the initial 
pioneers were present. Clearly, both of Lamarck’s laws are present with evidence of the firms 
acquiring specific characters that they deemed useful and those characters being directly 
inherited by future generations of pizzeria owners. For those pizzerias that were not 
responsible for any spin-offs, the application of Lamarckism to explain their development is 
problematic due to the lack of evidence regarding the heritability of their acquired characters. 
It is argued that at present a failing of Lamarckian explanations of socioeconomic evolution is 
the suggestion that imitation from afar is sufficient to account for the inheritance of acquired 
characters from one firm to another. The alternative explanation offered is that, in the absence 
of more specific evidence regarding the transmission of acquired characters, Darwinian 
specific processes are best used to account for the adaptation of social entities whose 
operations are relatively isolated from other industry participants.  
 
Such an alternative explanation can be outline with reference to Baldwinian evolution. 
Deacon (1997, p. 322) explains, ‘Baldwin’s theory explains how behaviors can effect 
evolution, but without the necessity of claiming that responses to environmental demands 
acquired during one’s lifetime could be passed directly to one’s offspring. Baldwin’s ‘A New 
Factor in Evolution’, published 1896, sought to refute Lamarckism through claiming that the 
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context of natural selection could be modified (for future generations) due to the process of 
learning and behavioral flexibility. Baldwin’s Darwinian inspired concept was however to 
many ‘a notion lying on the borderline of Lamarckism’ (Plotkin, 1993, p. 6). It however fits in 
with other Darwinian based explanations of adaptive survival, such as genetic assimilation 
(e.g. Waddington, 1969) and adaptive radiation (Baldwin, 1896)7. The point is, to ignore 
accepted Darwinian explanations of intentional adaptation to the environment in favor of 
Lamarckian explanations makes it all the more difficult to unite the adaptationist and 
selection viewpoints. Both sides can propose explanations of phenotypic plasticity through 
which adaptive behaviour results in reduced selection pressure. However, it would seem we 
have much ground to recover to again maintain Darwin’s (if begrudging) assimilation of 
Darwinian and Lamarckian processes to explain the ongoing evolution of entities. This past 
failure to dig deeper also prevents closer analysis of how selection forces impact evolution. 
 
4.2 Selection 
 Selection that produces evolution has been defined ‘as repeated cycles of replication, 
variation, and environmental interaction so structured that environmental interaction causes 
replication to be differential’ (Hull, Langman & Glenn, 2001, p. 53). Within organizational 
studies, selection is typically thought of as external or internal forces (to a firm) ‘that 
differentially select or selectively eliminate certain types of variations’ (Aldrich, 1999, p. 26). 
It is quite often assumed such forces ensure conformity to instutionalized norms and 
adherence to past (internal) selection criteria. However, a risk of ignorance remains ever 
present when selection is considered to primarily perform a stabilizing role within 
populations, given that it frequently behaves in different ways. Grant (1985) and Amburgey, 
Dacin and Kelly (1994) suggest that external selection processes can be considered in three 
                                                 
7 It is recognised that Baldwin, Morgan and Osborn all simultaneously and independently presented ideas related 
to adaptive radiation.   
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general patterns, stabilizing, directional, and disruptive. When attempting to reconcile the 
outcomes of various learning processes, it is critical that the nature and the type of selection 
occurring with the population is understood. To not do so would be to invite misinterpretation 
of any future data. 
 
For example, returning to the Hobart pizza industry, it can be observed that the most 
influential selection forces that shaped the evolution of the industry were directional and 
disruptive selection forces. The arrival of the first nationwide franchise chain increased the 
level of primary demand for pizza and changed the times when pizza was consumed. Those 
firms capable of following the lead of the very visible practices introduced by industry leaders 
seemed to benefit from the increasing demand for pizza (i.e. directional selection). 
Alternatively, the number of firms contesting the industry shifted radically downward with 
the arrival of the second nationwide franchise chain. Introducing harsh price-based 
competition, it was those firms that had neither a high quality (restaurant style) nor highly 
efficient (franchise style) operations that felt the full weight of the selection forces. In this 
instance, a disruptive selection process quickly removed those situated in between the quality 
and price-based offerings. The most noticeable example of stabilizing selection accompanied 
the disruptive selection of those neither specifically quality nor operationally efficient 
operators whose management of cash flows nevertheless saw them favoured by the 
introduction of a (10%) goods and services tax. Those that mismanaged their cashflow, 
irrespective of their market positioning, struggled to adapt to a market place that required 
tighter management of operating cashflow.     
 
4.3 Elements of Interaction 
This section aims to consider what elements of a firm interact with the environment in 
such a way that the result is the differential selection of the firm’s replicating entities. It has 
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been recently argued (Jones, 2005) that at present there appears to be an absence of focus 
upon what element/s of the firm is interacting with the environment. If the position of 
Hodgson (2003a) is taken, and habits and routines are taken as replicators, the question 
remains, what interacts? Aldrich (1999) states that firms of all sizes are characterised by the 
following three dimensions: goal-directed behaviours, boundary maintenance, and activity 
systems. From this perspective, why and where interaction occurs is accounted for 
respectively by the firm’s goals and boundaries. However, the activity systems of a firm 
cannot simply be considered as the interactor. Aldrich notes that activity systems are 
comprised of sets of routines and bundles of activities that facilitate the processing of raw 
materials, information and people. However, the question now arises, which activities are 
performed outside the firm and therefore interact with the environment, and which are 
performed inside and don’t interact with the environment? This task is all the more important 
given that Hodgson (2003a) rightly points out that routines cannot be both the generative 
structures (i.e. replicators) and the outcomes of such structures (i.e. interactors). It is therefore 
necessary to remove any potential confusion as to what elements of a firm interact and which 
elements replicate. 
 
Adapting Goffman’s (1959) dramaturgy approach, we can establish interaction 
boundaries using his frontstage, backstage metaphor. The frontstage represents the space 
where the firm’s performance interacts with the environment, whereas the backstage 
represents the space where this performance is rehearsed, planed, designed and implemented. 
The use of the metaphor encourages exploration of the suggested relationship between the 
interacting elements and the environment. The challenge remains to separate front stage from 
back stage, and to define what was visibly offered for consumption by the firm. Just as 
important is to establish which backstage processes (despite their invisibility) determined the 
nature of the performance.  
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If this challenge is resolved, then we can move beyond assuming the firm’s entire 
activity system interacts with its operating environment. We can see the proposition that the 
market selects and removes firms that have insufficient profits (Murmann, 2003), while true, 
is an after the event description of what has been selected. Given that markets are ‘in fact 
quite tolerant of underperformance’ (Whittington, 1993, p. 24), going beyond a default to 
profits is necessary. It is more likely that specific elements of the firm’s performance (rejected 
on the front stage) have caused insufficient profits. Therefore, a focus on interacting entities 
must move beyond activity systems, but not extend immediately to entire firms. What must be 
considered is the actual nature of what is offered for consumption. It has been proposed 
(Jones, 2005) that what constitutes the firm’s offerings could be considered, a combination of 
activities that are delivered by humans and technologies, actual products and services, and the 
identity of the firm. These three elements, while not representing an exhaustive search for all 
possible offerings provide elements of focus. Through them, we can see how change is 
enacted within the firm through modification to existing goals, boundaries and activities, and 
we have material elements whose consumption (i.e. marketplace acceptance) can be 
measured. The firm’s three interacting elements are now briefly considered in more detail.  
 
While a combination of activities that are delivered by humans and technologies 
seems broad in description, we can be more specific. This first element relates to all contact 
points through which the firm and its agents interact with all external stakeholder groups. The 
actual services and products the firm provides should require no further explanation as an 
element through which firm/stakeholder interaction occurs. The last proposed element is that 
of identity. Identity has previously been considered an interactor (Knudsen, 2002, p. 461) 
with regards to ‘the personal and professional identity of team members’. However, the 
proposed role of identity considered here is at the higher level of the firm itself. The literature 
tends to use the phase ‘corporate identity’ (Stuart, 1997) to describe corporate personality, 
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which is based upon corporate strategy. Here, the term ‘corporate’ will be used 
interchangeably with ‘firm’ to reflect the broad application of the evolutionary ideas 
expressed. Therefore, the identity of a firm embodies its culture and personality and a 
function of its interaction with external stakeholders is the firm’s image. It is this image that 
influences the firm’s fitness within its operating environment.    
 
 In going beyond profit as a factor directly selected for or against, other possible 
elements have been considered through which interaction with the environment may be better 
understood. This approach facilitates the separation of the processes that relate to interaction 
and replication. As will be discussed, a failure to do so would prevent the isolation of the 
specific processes that constitute a generative mechanism (i.e. mechanism of transmission), 
potentially subject to change through internal modification. 
 
4.4 Replication 
The major task according to Durham (1991, p. 24) is to identify what ‘governs the 
transmission of units [i.e. habits and routines] through space and time and either maintains or 
erodes variability’. That is, how can we explain the operation of entities that influence (and 
are differentially selected as a result of) the interacting elements of a firm? How can we 
account for the retention of current practices or the emergence of new practices, either of 
which may maintain, increase, or decrease overall fitness? Essentially what is being 
considered is an explanation of how the evolutionary process of variation, selection and 
retention occurs within the firm. Or, what learning capacity does a firm have (or not have), 
which in turn influence the composition of its interacting elements?  
 
Campbell (1965, p. 27) states that if all components of the variation-selection-
retention process are present, ‘a socio-cultural learning process is inevitable’. Learning is 
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described within an organizational setting as, outcomes related to change via analysis or 
imitation, or, a process of adaptation dependent upon delicately balancing exploration against 
exploitation (March, 1991). This suggests that to achieve learning dependent outcomes, both 
variation and retention processes must relate to each, despite the inherent forces that alienate 
each from the other. The ability of firms to select new variations (or retain existing variations) 
clearly shapes the nature of their interacting elements. However, to use an adaptation of 
Aristotle’s approach to the use of anger, any firm can change – that is easy. But to change the 
right activity systems, to the right degree, at the right time, for the right purpose, and in the 
right way – that is not easy. To further explore this issue, we need to consider Knudsen’s 
(2002) baseline idea. 
 
Both sides of the selection – adaptation argument can be reconciled within Knudsen’s 
(2002, p. 453) baseline theory, given his assertion that the progress of knowledge through an 
adaptive process ‘requires a baseline through which the value of a possible modification can 
be evaluated’. Therefore, the firm’s activity systems could represent behaviours that produce 
products and services, are responsible for the development of a firm’s identity, and facilitate 
contact between the firm’s systems (be they human of technological) and external 
stakeholders. In short, they are responsible for what occurs of the front stage. This 
performance is dependent upon the potential capabilities of the firm to plan, revise, and 
implement such behaviour. At anytime, the firm is in receipt of feedback from its audience. 
The market share achieved by products and services, the image present in the marketplace of 
the firm, and information received during contact between the staff and/or technological 
interface all represent substantial and ongoing feedback. This feedback should act to stimulate 
further planning, revision, and implementation of future performance. This activity is 
performed on the back stage and guided by the pressures of natural selection that are real and 
present on the front stage. This pressure should provide guidance to the adaptive intentions of 
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the firm. The process of internal selection, a function of the habits and routines present within 
the firm, is ultimately judged by the audience on the front stage.  
 
Just how such habits and routines combine to influence the composition of interacting 
elements remains largely a mystery. A developing approach (Jones, 2005) has been the 
overlaying of an existing conceptual framework to highlight the learning processes that 
connect back stage and front stage selection pressures. This has been attempted through 
consideration of Zahra and George’s reconceptualization of the absorptive capacity construct. 
They define absorptive capacity as having two distinct components that together are 
operationalized as ‘a set of organizational routines and processes by which firms acquire, 
assimilate, transform, and exploit knowledge to produce a dynamic organizational capability’ 
(2002, p. 186). Within this new definition are two specific components, potential (i.e. 
acquisition and assimilation) and realized (i.e. transformation and exploitation) absorptive 
capacity. Potential absorptive capacity is the capability to sense what information is relevant, 
acquire it, analysis it, comprehend it and internalise it. As such, it provides the firm an 
appreciation of the exogenous environmental forces that may or may not favour the firm’s 
existing offerings. Realized absorptive capacity relates to the processes that blend existing 
knowledge with newly acquired knowledge to gain new insights to opportunities or problems 
and provide structured pathways to develop new competencies. In aggregate, the two 
components potential provide the foundation of ‘a dynamic capability pertaining to 
knowledge creation and utilization’ (Zahra & George, 2002, p. 185). When viewed from an 
evolutionary perspective, it is argued that this interpretation of the absorptive capacity 
construct supports discussion of how, why, and when individual firms learn about 
environmental change. The construct also seems to fit with Hodgson’s (2003a) habits and 
routines as replicators approach.  
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The four dimensions of absorptive capacity; acquisition, assimilation, transformation, 
and exploitation, can be seen to be present as potential behaviours. These potential 
capabilities are triggered by external or internal events that cause to the firm to respond to the 
stimuli. That is, the firm’s ability to efficiently acquire and assimilate external knowledge is a 
function of their past capability to perform such behaviours under the same context and 
selective pressures. However, this learning potential only influences the firm’s evolutionary 
potential (Jones, 2003) if all four dimensions coexist as a cohesive whole. Merely increasing 
awareness of variations does not endow the firm with the ability to maintain or increase the 
fitness of the interacting elements. Thus, the firm is subject to selection at two specific levels. 
First, the interacting elements face the pressures of natural selection, and secondly, this 
interaction results in the differential selection of the habits/routines that support the 
replicating processes within the firm. Given that firm’s can acquire new characteristics from 
the marketplace, the firm’s degree of potential absorptive capacity shapes up as critical to the 
process of adapting to market shocks and exploiting opportunities. Importantly, this capability 
is mediated by the degree of prior knowledge held across specific domains. 
 
 The four issues discussed thus far can be now brought together and their 
interrelatedness considered in more detail. In doing so the challenges that confront the 
development of a sound evolutionary approach to the study of entrepreneurship are again 
highlighted. This discussion can be assisted with reference to Figure 3, Replicating and 
Interacting Entities (over the page).  
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Figure 3: Replicating and Interacting Entities 
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process through which a firm can acquire, assimilate, transform and exploit knowledge that 
can increase its overall degree of fitness. 
 
 Figure 3 does not attempt to suggest a new theory of evolution.  It merely attempts to 
bring together all the vital elements of an evolutionary theory into one model to provide a 
focus on the middle ground. It moves away from an assumption that the either the 
environment or the adaptive abilities of a firm provide a starting point for discussion of 
entrepreneurial behavior. It suggests that any such future discussion should be centred 
between those two viewpoints. As such, any conclusion regarding the outcomes of 
entrepreneurial behavior must be derived from proper consideration of the context and 
process of such behavior. The proposed model is therefore consistent with Aldrich and 
Martinez (2001) and satisfies the minimal requirements of any future evolutionary theory. 
The use of the construct absorptive capacity provides an example of how existing theory can 
be reconciled within an evolutionary approach, an essential feature of any future ‘evolutional 
model of organizational change’ (Aldrich, 1999, p. 42). 
 
5. Conclusion 
Essentially, what has been discussed is a Darwinian framework that does not 
discriminate against other forms of evolutionary thought. A dovetailing of Darwinism and 
Lamarckism is not only consistent with Darwin’s 6th edition of The Origin of Species; it is 
also supported in the current literature (Hodgson, 2001) on the proviso that Darwinism 
provides the overall framework. It has being argued that much trouble can be avoided by 
those pragmatic evolutionary theorists who tackle the real (and unresolved) issues that prevent 
the development of a sound evolutionary theory of entrepreneurship. It is suggested that the 
interactor – replicator framework developed by Hull (1988), provides a simple way of 
understanding the breadth and depth of a Darwinian approach.  
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Baum and Singh (1994) in using Hull’s framework, highlight three areas of 
consideration for the development of an evolutionary theory. They see organizational 
evolution as a process dependent upon various entities (e.g. habits, routines, firms, 
populations, and communities) that replicate and interact whilst a range of processes (e.g. 
copying, new enterprise, learning, and natural selection) occur during the specific events (e.g. 
start-up, transformation, and failure) in their life course. Their work is thought provoking and 
provides a pivotal stepping-stone worth revisiting. Figure 3 seeks to build upon such work by 
promoting a conceptual framework through which two kinds of processes (i.e. interaction and 
replication) can be seen to be connected to an entities desire to retain its form whilst always 
being capable of altering its form based on the ongoing feedback produced from ever 
occurring interaction. If it is reasonable to consider entrepreneurship as a function of the 
interaction occurring between human nature and the environment, then it is argued that Figure 
3 provides a lens to observe the process of entrepreneurship. 
 
The development of Figure 3 also serves to highlight the many questions that remain 
unanswered regarding an evolutionary theory of entrepreneurship. For instance, at what point 
are acquired characteristics inherited, and therefore representative of a Lamarckian process? 
To what extent is the nature and type of selection forces operating against the firm’s 
interacting elements clearly understood? Which specific elements of a firm interact with the 
operating environment in such a way that they cause the differential selection of a firm’s 
replicating entities? And lastly, what learning processes are observable that can be reconciled 
to the generic evolutionary process of variation, selection and retention? Within all these 
questions, an individual or team of individuals is assumed to be responsible for 
entrepreneurial behaviors, not firms. This position represents an acknowledgement that the 
majority of firms in the world are small firms with principals who have much responsibility 
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regarding the process and ability to change direction. Tackling these questions and the many 
others that require attention (Aldrich, 1999) is but one step towards the development of a 
sound and legitimate evolutionary theory of entrepreneurship. 
 
One last concluding comment is that the literature sources used throughout this 
discussion represent an extreme synthesis of eclectic work. Perhaps if this paper makes only 
the contribution of drawing attention to the need to consult beyond the comfortable 
boundaries of organizational theory, it will have made a valuable contribution. Contained 
within the above discussion are the thoughts of zoologists, sociologists, anthropologists, 
palaeontologists, philosophers, geneticists, and heterodox economists. Much care is required 
to bring together such seemingly disparate contributions and maintain contextual similarity. 
This may well be just one of the necessary challenges for those researchers who pursue the 
development of an evolutionary theory of entrepreneurship.   
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